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Information security practitioners are tasked with protecting their organisation’s assets and 
information – a sensitive area of work, especially in heavily regulated or critical infrastructure 
industries. Working directly with these individuals to learn more about HCI patterns and 
behaviours they display can be insightful, but not without challenges due to the perceived risk 
from sharing information involved. Ultimately, any public information may prove useful to 
potential attackers and actual risks can be difficult to quantify. This short position paper provides 
an introduction to the field before informally describing a number of experiences and observations 
made when working with financial services information security practitioners in a limited number 
of studies. This is followed by an indication of challenges and opportunities in this area to help 
enable potential discussions with other researchers and lastly a brief summary. 
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Common research themes  
in HCISec and Usable Security  
(based on [3]) 
 
• Realigning usability and security, e.g. human 
factors and user-centred design in security 
• Authentication mechanisms, e.g. passwords 
or biometrics 
• Secure systems, e.g. secure interaction design 
(for example to help prevent Phishing 
attacks) 
• Privacy and anonymity systems, e.g. privacy 
issues in HCI and human-centred privacy 
• Commercial approaches to usability and 
security experiences  
• Research efforts in areas outside of usability 
and security touching on these areas or 




Information security, its principles and processes aim to protect the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information. Learning about how humans operate in this space, whether in their 
private life or as an employee in an organisation, has been of interest to academic communities 
such as HCISec and Usable Security researchers, with dedicated conferences such as the 
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) [7] long in existence and traditional HCI 
conferences explicitly inviting submissions in this area (e.g. for Interact 2019 [4]).  
Past research efforts in the area have addressed a multitude of topics (refer also to left column), 
ranging from usability studies of secure applications and systems, privacy concerns, evaluations of 
passwords and authentication solutions, user perspectives on security and usage of human-centred 
design and HCI methods in security – an excellent primer to the field is provided in ‘Security and 
Usability - Designing Secure Systems that People Can Use’ edited by Garfinkel and Cranor [3]. 
While many of these examples follow well-established routes and best practices in HCI research 
with a specific application to the field of information security, some HCI research for security can 
be identified as particularly sensitive and problematic in regard to ethical approval processes, 
ability to recruit participants and ultimately ways of publication. Although by no means a 
complete list of these affected areas of research, a few areas can be used as an example in this 
context. In-the-wild field studies, where security researchers simulate a realistic (but harmless) 
attack and usually deceive the participants about the real purpose behind the situation to learn 
more about the participant’s behaviour in response to the attack, can be included here [6]. 
Although widely used and encouraged by the security community, purposeful vulnerability 
disclosure seems to carry a number of ethical challenges [5], with anecdotal evidence even hinting 
at assault against commercial security researchers after exposing security flaws [2].  
Further to these examples, working directly with security practitioners in organisations around the 
topics of HCI and security may pose methodological challenges: from recruiting suitable 
participants, evaluating the risk of publication to ultimately gaining approval from both 
organisational side and academic institution. While some excellent examples of such research 
efforts exist as discussed in [1] for example, no best practice guidance and reference materials seem 
to be available at this point in time. This difficulty may be amplified for critical infrastructure 
sectors such as public health or telecommunications as well as heavily regulated industries such as 
financial services or pharmaceutical manufacturing. 
Following this introduction and background section, a brief review of own past experiences in the 
field both as a researcher and participant is presented in this short position paper. This is intended 
to form a tangible and accessible discussion basis with other workshop participants, but also to 
potentially help shape practical recommendations and theoretical ideas for future research 
directions. Initial opportunities for next steps are included towards the end of this document as is a 






EXPERIENCES FROM FINANCIAL SERVICES 
This section provides a brief reflection with key experiences and observations made when working 
with a number of financial services practitioners (<20, manager/executive level) in two separate 
studies (a security persona set evaluation focus group and separate semi-structured interviews 
human/attacker-centric security) carried out last year (2018) to be shared with other workshop 
participants. This is supplemented by own past experiences and observations as a participant in 
financial services usability studies and other HCI concept studies. While limited in scale and hence 
expressiveness at this point in time, it would be interesting to discuss and compare these 
observations with others – it is also hoped that this will help prepare for guiding future research or 
lead to the production of best practice recommendations for similar studies if at all feasible. 
 
As a researcher 
For the limited examples mentioned, the following experiences and observations can be noted in 
this context: 
• Generally, financial services security practitioners were passionate, seemed keen to talk 
about their ways of working and were willing to comment on prototypes/research 
examples. 
• However, there was a relatively high drop-out rate with some participants ultimately not 
agreeing to have their data used for research/publication (10-15% of initial participants). 
• Employees at analyst or assistant level seemed more reluctant to take part from the start 
or ended participation early (risk perception?). 
• Sign-off via email for gathered data and insights to be used in publication seem to work 
well for this audience and satisfy the need for risk management from their side. An 
objective risk assessment seemed difficult for the researcher in this position. 
• Recruitment of participants from financial start-up companies rather than established 
financial services organisations proved difficult. 
 
As a participant 
For the limited examples mentioned, the following experiences and observations can be noted in 
this context: 
• Often, testing seems to be technically difficult and complex to set up (e.g. new mobile 
concepts and prototypes), but amount of resulting data and analysis may be limited. 
• No dedicated risk assessment seemed to have been undertaken or had been provided to 





























• Risks or potential outcomes to the study did not seem to play a major role or were not 
shared with participants. 
• There seems to be high levels of informal/ad-hoc studies (via e.g. short surveys), whereas 
larger scale external studies involving customers would be managed through a third-party 
handling recruitment and taking care of legal aspects (for commercial HCI studies in 
financial services). 
• Email seems to be the preferred medium to share participant information and follow-up 
once the study had been completed (comfort vs need for evidence). 
 
CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES: WHERE TO NEXT? 
From this small sample of cases and related observations, several challenges can be highlighted 
and potentially warrant further discussion. Provided the sensitive nature of information security in 
a large financial services organisation, the current treatment and presentation of risk requires 
further enquiry – at this point, it is indicated that recruitment and participation rates may be 
hindered, but there may also be a wider impact on ethical and legal aspects of research. Another 
challenge to overcome seems to be the ability to recruit participants from non-traditional, new 
entrants to the market – it is unclear whether risk perception plays a role in this context, but it 
could be that for these organisations, the risk of giving away potentially sensitive information 
outweighs potential benefits. 
On the other hand, there are already some aspects and practices that seem to work for this 
particular setting of information security and financial services. Using email communications and 
exact sign-off procedures for the results to be published seems to work well to reduce perceived 
risks. Overall, given the sensitive area of work these practitioners carry out, the level of 
engagement was encouraging and pro-research, which is likely to originate from the research-
driven culture found in information security. 
SUMMARY 
While working directly with information security practitioners in heavily regulated industries such 
as financial services can be hugely rewarding and insightful, considering present challenges may 
help to improve research practice in the field. Whether it is a more proactive perspective on risk, 
strengthening current best practices or learning from other subject areas, there seem to be several 
opportunities and routes to develop and progress from here. Discussing common and similar 
challenges, but also different perspectives and opposite opinions, with other workshop participants 
would serve as an excellent starting point for moving towards positive changes in practical 
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